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Abstract: 
In this article, the author assesses whether Canadian Inuit sealers, which have suffered 
economic damage in the wake of the introduction of the EU ban on seal products, can bring 
an action for damages against the EU before the European Court of Justice. The author 
reviews why the EU ban on seal hunting violates WTO law and discusses if, and why, 
Canadian Inuit sealers can rely on a violation of the WTO Agreements as a legal basis in a 
potential claim for damages under EU law. Moreover, the author criticizes the current state of 
EU law, which does not grant reparation of the economic damage suffered by indigenous 
communities when carrying out their traditional seal hunts that are protected under UN human 
rights law.     
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In 2009, the EU legislators put in place what is commonly known as the ‘EU Seal Regime.’ 
The regime consists of a package of secondary legislation, which seeks to address the ever-
increasing public demand for improved animal welfare conditions.1 In order to achieve this 
goal, the EU introduced a general ban on the import and selling of seal products on the 
internal market. The ban came into force in 2010. However, the EU did not wish to ban the 
marketing of all seal products. The ban targets primarily ‘commercial’ seal products, and 
contains an exception for the continued marketing of products derived from seal hunts 
traditionally conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities that contribute to their 
subsistence. The exception is henceforth referred to as the ‘IC exception.’ One of the most 
problematic aspects of the Seal Regime is the exclusionary effect the ban has had on Canadian 
Inuit sealers. Since the ban came into force, and up until 2015, the Canadian Inuit have not 
been able to benefit from the exception. 
 
Shortly after the introduction of the EU Seal Regime in 2009, Canada filed a complaint 
against the EU under the WTO dispute settlement system.2 Canada claimed, inter alia, that the 
Regime violated the obligations of the EU under the WTO agreements. The dispute was 
finally settled in 2014, when the WTO Appellate Body in EC Seal Products at long last 
concluded that EU Seal Regime was inconsistent with WTO law.  
 
                                                            
1 The ‘EU Seal Regime’ consists of Regulation 1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ L286/36. This Regulation has been amended by 
Regulation 2015/1775/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 amending 
Regulation 1007/2009/EC on trade in seal products and repealing Commission Regulation 737/2010/EU [2015] 
OJ L262/1. The key provisions concerning the implementation of the ban are now found in Commission 
Implementing Regulation 2015/1850/EU of 13 October 2015 laying down detailed rules for the implementation 
of Regulation 1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal products [2015] OJ 
L271/1. 
2 EC Seal Products, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (May 22, 2014). The dispute involving Norway in the associated dispute European - 
Communities Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 
2014), will not be dealt with here. 
In EC Seal Products, the WTO Appellate Body found that the EU Seal Regime violated the 
‘most-favoured-nation’ principle in Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (GATT 1994). The reason for the WTO inconsistency was that the EU Seal Regime 
operated with a distinction between ‘commercial’ seal products, which were all out banned, 
and seal products which could be imported into the EU under the IC exception. The IC 
exception applied to seal products which derived from traditional hunts conducted by Inuit or 
other indigenous communities and contributed to their subsistence.3 However, although the IC 
exception was origin-neutral on its face, it was de facto inconsistent with Article I:1. The 
reason for this was that virtually all Greenlandic seal products were likely to qualify under the 
IC exception, but that the vast majority of Canadian seal products were unable to meet the 
requirements of the IC exception. Based on this finding, the IC exception was inconsistent 
with Article I:1, since it did not ‘immediately and unconditionally’ extend the same market 
access advantage to Canadian seal products.4  
 
Having confirmed that the IC exception was inconsistent with the ‘most-favoured-nation’ 
principle, the WTO Appellate Body then turned to examine whether the difference in 
treatment between Greenlandic and Canadian Inuit seal products could be justified under 
Article XX of the GATT 1994. Article XX allows differential treatment based on objective 
criteria, provided that the measure imposed does not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.’ According to the EU, the IC exception could be justified under Article XX 
subparagraph (a) of the GATT 1994 as a measure ‘necessary to protect public morals.’ The 
WTO Appellate Body agreed that, in principle, a ban on sealing could be regarded as 
‘necessary to protect public morals.’5 However, the WTO Appellate Body found that the 
exclusion of Canadian Inuit products from the EU market constituted ‘arbitrary or unjustified’ 
discrimination.  
 
                                                            
3 See Regulation 1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in 
seal products [2009] OJ L286/36, Article 3(1). 
4 EC Seal Products, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (May 22, 2014), at para. 5.95. 
5 Ibid., at para. 5.290. 
The first and foremost reason for the finding that the discrimination was ‘arbitrary or 
unjustified,’ was the lack of a sufficient explanation from the EU as to how the IC exception 
was related to the objective of the EU Seal Regime.6 The WTO Appellate Body stressed that 
the EU had failed to explain how an exception for seal products hunted by Inuit or other 
indigenous peoples, could be reconciled with, or was in any way related to, the policy 
objective of addressing public moral concerns regarding animal welfare. Based on the fact 
that seal hunting carried out by Inuit or other indigenous causes the same pain and suffering 
for seals as ‘commercial’ hunts, the EU had failed to explain how the IC exception could be 
reconciled with the policy objective of reducing EU public moral concerns regarding animal 
welfare.7 
 
Furthermore, the WTO Appellate Body found that another ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ aspect 
of the EU Seal Regime, was the requirement in the EU Seal Regime to set up a ‘recognized 
body’ in the state that wished to benefit from the IC exception.8 Among the tasks of the 
‘recognized body’ was to certify that seal products cleared for export to the EU derived from 
proper Inuit hunts and to ensure that no ‘commercial’ seal products were among the products 
selected. The WTO Appellate Body pointed out that the establishment of a ‘recognized body’ 
entailed significant burdens for those who wished to apply the IC exception. Moreover, the 
EU had contributed to the establishment of a ‘recognized body’ in Greenland, but had not 
made comparable efforts to facilitate the setting up of a ‘recognized body’ in Canada.9  
 
It was only after the 2014 panel report presented by the WTO Appellate Body in EC Seal 
Products, which concluded that the design of the legal regime constituted unjustified 
                                                            
6 Ibid., at para. 5.319.  
7 Ibid., at para. 5.320. 
8 See [now repealed] Commission Regulation 737/2010/EU of 10 August 2010 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Regulation 1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal 
products [2015] OJ L262/1, Article 6.  
9 EC Seal Products, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R (May 22, 2014), at para. 5.337-5.338. 
discrimination under WTO law, that the EU decided to amend its regime and took steps to 
restore marked access for Canadian Inuit seal products. In the wake of the report of the WTO 
Appellate Body, the EU has gone to lengths to address the elements in the Seal Regime that 
were considered to violate WTO law.10 Most notably, the EU has attempted to address the 
lack of relationship between the IC exception and the protection of animal welfare. The 2015 
amendment to Regulation 1007/2009/EC on trade in seal products, now stresses in Article 
3(1)(c) that IC seal products can only be placed on the EU market if ‘the hunt is conducted in 
a manner which has due regard to animal welfare taking into consideration the way of life of 
the community and the subsistence purpose of the hunt.’ However, it is difficult to 
comprehend how this subtle request aimed at indigenous hunters to respect animal welfare, 
can fully remedy the lack of coherence between the IC exception and the policy objective of 
reducing EU public moral concerns regarding such hunts.   
 
Besides addressing the legal aspects of the Seal Regime that were in violation of the 
obligations WTO agreements, the EU engaged with Canada in order to facilitate the 
establishment of an attestation mechanism, which would allow the Canadian Inuit to export 
seal products to the EU market.11 More specifically, since 30 July 2015, the Government of 
Nunavut has been recognized as an attestation body that is qualified to certify Inuit seal 
products under the EU Seal Regime.12 The establishment of the Government of Nunavut as an 
attestation body now allows Canadian Inuit to invoke the IC exception, and brought an end to 
the five year exclusion of Canadian Inuit seal products from the EU market.  
 
                                                            
10 For a complete reference to the updated ‘EU Seal Regime’, see fn. 1 above. 
11 See Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute 
European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (WT/DS400 and 
WT/DS401), 16 October 2015.  
12 See Commission Decision of 26 October 2015 recognising the Department of Environment, Government of 
Nunavut in accordance with Article 3 of Implementing Regulation 2015/1850/EU laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of Regulation 1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on trade in seal 
products [2015] OJ C355/4. 
Despite the recent efforts, the EU Seal Regime has already had a significant impact on the 
sealing industry. Following the announcement, and the subsequent introduction of the ban, 
international demand for seal products declined sharply and caused a collapse of the entire 
market for such products.13 The impact on Canadian Inuit sealers was especially harsh.14 As 
observed by Canada, speaking on behalf of Inuit and non-Inuit sealers in the course of the 
proceedings before the WTO dispute settlement system, the ban has already affected the 
entire sealing industry, and has had a particularly negative effect on the Inuit community:15 
‘The effect of the EU Seal Regime is to exclude from the EU market all seal products derived 
from seals killed in commercial hunts, regardless of whether they were harvested humanely. 
In doing so, the EU Seal Regime has effectively shut out Canadian seal products from the EU 
market. The negative economic impacts of this measure have reverberated through coastal 
communities in the Canadian Maritimes, where economic opportunities are limited, and in 
Canada's Inuit communities, where the Inuit have historically relied on the income generated 
from seal skin sales to supplement their subsistence-oriented lives.’ 
 
Although the EU has now amended the features of its Seal Regime that violate WTO law, 
challenging issues remain unsolved. A mere re-establishment of access to the EU market is 
not, in and of itself, sufficient to remedy negative consequences suffered by Canadian Inuit 
sealers as a result of the five-year exclusion from the market. Thus, the main purpose of this 
article is to discuss whether the EU legislators can be held legally accountable for the 
discriminatory exclusion of Canadian Inuit sealers from the EU market. The form of 
accountability looked into here concerns the possibility for individual Canadian Inuit Sealers 
                                                            
13 D. Cambou, ‘The Impact of the Ban on Seal Products on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A European Issue’ 
(2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law 389-415, at p. 391 fn. 8 and p. 414. 
14 The market value for sealskin decreased by over 50% within a year of the entry into force of Regulation 
1007/2009, despite a significant reduction in the numbers of seals harvested: Nikolas Sellheim, ‘The Goals of the 
EU Seal Products Trade Regulation: From Effectiveness to Consequence’ (2015) 51 Polar Record 274-289, at p. 
284. 
15 See the Integrated executive summary of Canada, in European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Reports of the Panel, WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R, Addendum, 
Annex B-1, (November 25, 2013), at para. 2. 
to claim reparations in an action for damages before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). The question discussed is whether a potential action for damages filed by 
Canadian Inuit sealers, can be based on the claim that that the EU Seal Regime constituted 
unlawful discrimination under WTO law.  
 
In the second part of this article, ‘Overcoming Formalities’, it is asked whether a potential 
lawsuit against the EU for its violation of its violation of WTO law is admissible before the 
European Courts. The third part of the article is called ‘WTO law in the EU legal order – Can 
the Canadian Inuit base a claim for damages on a violation of the WTO Agreements?’ This 
part concerns the question of the direct effect’ of WTO law, i.e. whether individuals, such as 
Canadian Inuit sealers, can rely on a violation of the WTO Agreements as a legal basis in a 
claim for damages against the EU. In the fourth and final part, the author concludes, and 
provides a critical assessment concerning the current state of the rights of indigenous peoples 
under EU law.   
 
Overcoming Formalities – Is a potential lawsuit against the EU for its violation of WTO 
law admissible before the CJEU? 
Before the substantive criteria of liability of the EU legislators can be assessed, it is necessary 
to discuss whether a potential plea by Canadian Inuit sealers based on a violation of WTO law 
is admissible before the CJEU. When an action for damages is directed at one or more EU 
institutions, Article 268 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) lays down 
that ‘[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating 
to compensation for damage provided for in the second and third paragraphs of Article 340.’16 
In turn, the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU declares that, ‘[i]n the case of non-
contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the 
laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants 
in the performance of their duties.’ 
 
                                                            
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon, 13 December 2007, in 
force 1 January 2009) 2008 O.J. C 115/47. 
The CJEU has confirmed that cases concerning the non-contractual liability of the EU under 
Article 340(2) TFEU is an independent form of action.17 In the case Van Parijs and Others, 
the CJEU laid down that although an action for annulment has been declared as inadmissible, 
this does not automatically imply that an action for damages is also inadmissible.18 In relation 
to the Canadian Inuit, access to an autonomous legal action under Article 340(2) can prove 
important. The reason for this is that Canadian Inuit sealers and interest groups have on 
previous occasions brought unsuccessful actions for annulment of the EU Seal Regime before 
the CJEU. In the 2013 case, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, 
the CJEU dismissed the action brought by the litigants for the annulment of Regulation 
1007/2009/EC as inadmissible.19 Again, in 2015, in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v 
Commission, the litigants sought the annulment of the implementing Regulation (EU) No 
737/2010.20 In the 2015 case, the CJEU decided to conduct a material review of the action for 
annulment EU Seal Regime, but the plea failed on its merits. Inter alia, the litigants claimed 
that Article 114 TFEU could be relied upon as a legal basis for the ban and that the Regime 
violated the fundamental economic and social interests of Inuit communities engaged in seal 
hunts.21 However, none of the arguments put forward by the litigants were successful and the 
case was subsequently dismissed. 
 
In previous cases concerning compensations for alleged infringements of WTO law, the CJEU 
has been willing to consider the substantive claims brought forward by the litigants. For 
example, in the case FIAMM and others, the EU Court of First Instance conducted a full 
                                                            
17 See A Davies, ‘Bananas, Private Challenges, the Courts and the Legislature’ (2001) Yearbook of European 
Law, Volume 21, issue 1, 299-326, at p. 309.  
18 Van Parijs and Others v Council and Commission, Case C-257/93 [1993] ECR I-3335, at para. 14. 
19 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, Case C-583/11 [2013], ECLI:EU:C:2013:625. 
20 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, Case C-398/13 [2015], ECLI:EU:C:2015:535.  
21 For a critique of the reliance upon Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the adoption of Regulation 
1007/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal products 
[2009] OJ L286/36, see M Hennig, ‘The EU Seal Products Ban – Why Ineffective Animal Welfare Protection 
Cannot Justify Trade Restrictions under European and International Trade Law’ (2015) Vol. 6, No. 1 Arctic 
Review on Law and Politics 74–86.  
assessment of the substantive questions concerning a claim for damages presented by two 
Italian companies directed at the EU Council and the EU Commission.22 This case arose in 
the wake of the turmoil caused by the adoption of the so-called EU ‘bananas regime,’ and the 
finding of the WTO Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III, where it was confirmed that the EU 
import regime was incompatible with the obligations under the WTO agreements.23 The EU 
‘bananas regime’ discriminated against certain third countries, and the United States was 
authorised to retaliate by way of increased import taxes on a number of products 
manufactured in the EU.24 The increased import taxes caused economic damage to the Italian 
companies, and these companies thus requested compensation from the EU on the basis of 
Articles 235 and 288(2) EC [now Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU]. The action for damages 
was accepted as admissible, but eventually failed on its merits by reason that the substantive 
conditions for EU liability were not met.25  
 
In sum, Articles 268 and 340(2) TFEU establish a low threshold for admissibility, and it is 
likely that a potential action for compensation for the damage suffered by Canadian Inuit 
sealers will be brought forward and decided on its merits by the CJEU. However, although the 
procedural facets of a lawsuit can be overcome, the pressing issue is the seemingly 
insurmountable threshold for establishing liability on part of the EU, even in the face of 
blatant violations of WTO law. This is dealt with in the following section.  
 
                                                            
22 FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission, Case T-69/00 [2005] ECR II-5393. 
23 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - AB-1997-3 - Report 
of the Appellate Body, (September 9, 1997). 
24 For a detailed recount of the trade war between the United States and the EU leading up to, see Opinion of 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 20 February 2008, in FIAMM and Fedon, Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-
121/06 ECLI:EU:C:2008:98, at paras. 1-2.  
25 In the appeal case FIAMM and Fedon, the European Court of Justice came to the same conclusion concerning 
the admissibility of the claim for damages, FIAMM and Fedon, Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-121/06 [2008] 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:476.  
WTO law in the EU legal order – Can the Canadian Inuit base a claim for damages on a 
violation of the WTO Agreements?  
 
In this section, it is discussed whether the EU can be held responsible for the economic 
damage suffered by Canadian Inuit sealers. In this regard, it will be assessed whether the 
violation of WTO law between 2010 and 2015 implicates non-contractual liability for 
unlawful conduct on the part of the EU. In the case law of the CJEU, Article 340(2) TFEU 
has consistently been interpreted as meaning that the right to compensation depends on the 
satisfaction of three cumulative conditions.26 Firstly, the claimants must have suffered 
economic loss that is not the result of their own decisions. Secondly, one or more EU 
institutions must have acted unlawfully and thirdly there must be a causal link between the 
unlawful conduct of the EU and the damage inflicted.  
 
Only the second condition will be discussed in further detail here. Of the three cumulative 
conditions for compensation, it is the question whether or not a violation of WTO induces 
liability under EU law, which involves the most significant and pressing matters of principle. 
As to the first and third conditions, it is for the Canadian Inuit to demonstrate that the EU Seal 
Regime has caused an economic loss and to prove that the alleged unlawful conduct of the EU 
is the cause of this loss. 
 
In order to assess whether the establishment of the EU Seal Regime was unlawful, it must first 
be asked what effect the WTO Agreements, like other international agreements, have within 
the EU legal order.27 The general, and obvious, starting point for answering this question is in 
the wording of Article 216 (2) TFEU, which states that ‘[a]greements concluded by the Union 
are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.’ However, although 
it is clear from this provision that an agreement concluded by the EU is ‘binding’, this does 
not automatically mean that a violation of the agreement in question implicates liability on the 
                                                            
26 FIAMM and Fedon, Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-121/06 [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:476, para. 164. 
27 See generally, P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2015), at p. 361. 
part of the EU. In the case law of the CJEU, in order for EU non-contractual liability to incur, 
a further condition must be met. This is the condition that the agreement which has been 
infringed, must confer rights on individuals.28 Another way of frasing this condition, is to ask 
whether an agreement is capable of having ‘direct effect.’ In the context of a possible action 
against the EU concerning the infringements of WTO law in the Seal Regime, the question 
that has to be answered is whether the WTO agreements are capable of having such ‘direct 
effect.’29  
 
The ‘direct effect’ of the WTO Agreements was considered by the CJEU in Portugal v 
Council.30 In this case, the Portuguese Government claimed that an EU regulation, giving 
textile products from third countries access to the EU market, constituted a breach of certain 
rules and fundamental principles of the WTO Agreements, and in particular the rules and 
principles laid down in GATT 1994. The Portuguese Government requested an annulment of 
the contested EU regulation, and claimed that it was entitled to rely on the WTO Agreements 
before the CJEU for the purpose of reviewing the legality of the Council measure.   
 
The CJEU was not convinced that the WTO agreements were in principle among the rules, 
which were capable of producing a ‘direct effect’, and furthermore not among the rules in the 
light of which the CJEU would conduct a review of the legality of EU law.31 The reason for 
rejecting the ‘direct effect’ of the WTO agreements lies in the nature of these agreements. 
                                                            
28 Cordis v Commission, Case T-18/99 [2001] ECR II-913, at para. 45. 
29 See generally A Davies, ‘Bananas, Private Challenges, the Courts and the Legislature’ (2001) 21(1) Yearbook 
of European Law 299-326, at pp. 301-303. 
30 Portugal v Council, Case C-149/96 [1999] ECR I-8395. Prior to Portugal v Council, the CJEU held in 
Germany v Council that the GATT rules do not have direct effect and that individuals cannot rely on them before 
the EU courts in actions concerning the lawfulness of an EU act. The only exception to this general rule arises if 
the EU has intended to implement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of the GATT or if 
the EU act in question refers to specific provisions in the GATT, see Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] 
ECR I-4973, paragraphs 103 to 112. 
31 Portugal v Council, Case C-149/96 [1999] ECR I-8395, para. 47. 
According to the CJEU, “the agreement establishing the WTO, including the annexes, is still 
founded, like GATT 1947, on the principle of negotiations with a view to ‘entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.’”32 Furthermore, the CJEU placed 
emphasis on the fact that other third country external trading partners of the EU, had 
concluded that the provisions of the WTO agreements were not among the rules applicable by 
their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of their domestic laws.33 Thus, if the EU 
were placed under an obligation to ensure that EU law was in compliance with WTO law, it 
would ‘deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for 
maneuver enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community's trading partners.’34 The CJEU 
therefore laid down that the WTO agreements do not have ‘direct effect’ and could not be 
invoked as measures in the light of which the legality of EU law could be reviewed.   
 
Since WTO law has not been granted direct effect in actions for annulment of EU legislative 
acts is high, one might be tempted to believe that the threshold for granting direct effect to the 
WTO agreements in actions concerning compensation would be lower. Compensation for 
economic damage does not characterize EU legislative acts as unlawful, but merely corrects 
the financial wrongdoing suffered by individuals. Thus, compensation for damages seems like 
a reasonable remedy, especially in those instances where it is up and clear that EU legislation 
is in violation of WTO law. Such an example is where the WTO panels have firmly concluded 
that an area of EU law is in violation of the WTO agreements. As mentioned above, the 
Canadian Inuit sealers are currently in this situation in the wake of the report of the WTO 
Appellate Body where it was concluded that the EU Seal Regime had a discriminatory effect.     
 
Nevertheless, even in the face of blatant violations of WTO law, the CJEU has not shown 
willingness to allow litigants to rely on the WTO agreements in actions for damages. In the 
FIAMM and others-case referred to above in the second part of this article, the litigants found 
themselves in a situation with similarities to the current position of Canadian Inuit sealers.35 
                                                            
32 Ibid., para. 42. 
33 Ibid., para. 43. 
34 Ibid., para. 46. 
35 FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission, Case T-69/00 [2005] ECR II-5393. 
As a result of the ‘banana war’, the two Italian companies in question had suffered an 
economic loss due to the retaliatory customs duties imposed by the United States on certain 
products from the EU. After the finding by the WTO Appellate Body that the ‘EU Banana 
Regime’ was in violation of the WTO agreements, the EU eventually amended the Regime 
and the United States lifted its custom duties.   
 
The Court of First Instance rejected the claim for compensation for damages brought forward 
by the two companies. The European Court of Justice dismissed the subsequent appeals.36 
Although the WTO Appellate Body unequivocally had found that the EU ‘Banana Regime’ 
was in violation of WTO law, the CJEU was not, in parallel with cases concerning the validity 
of secondary EU legislation, willing to give ‘direct effect’ to the WTO agreements for the 
purpose of deciding an action for compensation. According to the CJEU, there was no reason 
to draw a distinction between the possible ‘direct effect’ of WTO law in cases concerning the 
review of the legality of EU law in annulment proceedings and in actions concerning claims 
for compensation.37 Furthermore, the CJEU added that although a WTO body finds an 
infringement it ‘cannot have the effect of requiring a party to the WTO agreements to accord 
individuals a right which they do not hold by virtue of those agreements in the absence of 
such a decision.’38 
 
Based on the case law of the CJEU, it thus seems highly improbable that an action for 
damages based on the violation of WTO in the EU Seal Regime will be successful. Under the 
current state of EU law, even in the face of blatant violations of the WTO commitments, the 




                                                            
36 FIAMM and Fedon, Joined Cases C-120/06 and C-121/06 [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:476. 
37 Ibid., at para. 120. 
38 Ibid., at para. 131. 
 
It is, of course, understandable that the EU institutions must retain a certain scope for 
maneuver in negotiations with external trading partners. It is furthermore reasonable that the 
EU institutions retain a certain element of discretion and leeway in dealings with trading 
partners under the WTO Agreements. It cannot, and should not, be so that the WTO 
Agreements have a more severe impact on the EU institutions than on other WTO members. 
The EU must be awarded the same discretion as individual WTO member states. The general 
stance of the CJEU is that the WTO rules cannot be relied on, even in the cases where a WTO 
panel, or the Appellate Body, has found one or more violations of the agreements. In this way, 
the lack of any ‘direct effect’ of the WTO agreements protects the EU from potential actions 
from individuals seeking compensation for the losses incurred by EU institutions acting in 
disregard of their obligations under the agreement.   
 
Thus, under current EU law, the prospects of bringing an action for damages before the CJEU 
seeking damages for the five year exclusion from the EU market of Canadian Inuit seal 
products, are grim. At least from a purely legal perspective, it is highly unlikely that the CJEU 
will rule in favour of any possible litigants seeking to address the financial damage caused by 
the exclusion from the EU market in the period from 2010 to 2015. However, from a political 
point of view and a consideration of the fairness of the situation, the EU should make efforts 
to compensate the financial losses incurred by Canadian Inuit sealers.  
 
 
